

Before the Expert Panel

FTAA-2504-1054

Under **Fast-track Approvals Act 2024**

In the matter of an application for approvals in relation to the Ryans Road Industrial Development

By **Carter Group Limited**
Applicant

Supplementary statement of evidence of Simon McPherson

17 March 2026

Applicant's solicitors:

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lloyd.**

Supplementary statement of Simon McPherson

Introduction

- 1 My full name is Simon McPherson.
- 2 I have been asked by the Applicant to prepare this supplementary statement of evidence to assist the Panel by responding to recent material filed on behalf of Airways New Zealand (**Airways**) and Christchurch International Airport Limited (**CIAL**), and to clarify the technical basis on which I have concluded that aviation effects are acceptable in aviation risk terms.
- 3 This statement will address:
 - (a) The Statement of Evidence of Robert Henry Grimm, on behalf of Airways Corporation of New Zealand (**Airways**), dated 12 March 2026.
 - (b) The Statement of Evidence of John Clifford Kyle, on behalf of CIAL, dated 12 March 2026.
 - (c) The scale and significance of the effects that I have assessed as being 'acceptable' and what 'acceptable' means in aviation terms.

Code of practice for expert witnesses

- 4 I have prepared this statement of evidence in my capacity as an expert, and I acknowledge that I have read and understand the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses contained in the Environment Court Practice Note 2023. I have complied with it when preparing this statement of evidence. Other than where I state that I am relying on the evidence of another person, my evidence is within my area of expertise. I have not omitted to consider material facts known to me that might alter or detract from the opinions that I express.

Mr Grimm's Evidence

- 5 I have reviewed Mr Grimm's evidence and I disagree with the conclusions provided. Mr Grimm's evidence raises a range of hypothetical risks, but does not substantiate those concerns by identifying specific, quantified effects arising from the proposal as modelled.

- 6 In contrast, our modelling and assessment has considered and evaluated specific effects using a worst-case development scenario.
- 7 Mr Grimm's evidence describes seven standard steps for an Airways assessment and acknowledges that the first three steps have been satisfied by the proposal. However, Mr Grimm does not acknowledge that the Cyrrus modelling undertaken (per steps 1-3 as completed) is the industry-accepted method of pre-development assessment.
- 8 To the extent that remaining steps have not been undertaken, Mr Grimm does not acknowledge or explain that:
 - (a) Regular flight checks for nav aids presently and routinely occur and these test the performance of the nav aids themselves in their existing environment. These checks do not indicate any inaccuracies or shortcomings in the modelling undertaken.
 - (b) Pre-development aviation assessment necessarily relies on modelling (per steps 1-3), because physical flight testing and on-site measurements are not possible until built form exists. That is precisely why conservative assumptions and worst-case modelling are standard practice internationally at the consent stage.
 - (c) The 'engineering' and other checks by Airways that Mr Grimm claims need to occur could only entail further refinement of modelling once final design details (such as materials and construction methods) are known, using the same modelling techniques already applied. In the absence of any identified methodological deficiency, there is no technical basis to expect a materially different outcome.
 - (d) The modelling uses a "perfect reflector" and maximum built form (impossible worst-case) scenario and thus the actual development outcome will be inherently safer.

9 In terms of other specific issues raised by Mr Grimm, I address these below:

Glidepath effects

- 10 Mr Grimm overstates the significance of potential glidepath effects. The modelling shows that once the building is rotated as proposed, disturbance is negligible and does not affect flyability.

DME

- 11 Mr Grimm's discussion of DME appears directed at smaller aircraft, but it is not clear what operational issue is being identified. If an aircraft reaches the

missed approach point, it must either land visually or execute a missed approach on the same heading. In those circumstances, DME is not relied upon initially. DME is otherwise unaffected by the proposal. In all cases, aircraft safety and procedural integrity is unaffected by the proposal, with respect to the DME and the category or type of aircraft has no bearing on this.

- 12 In any case, in my memorandum dated 5 March 2026, it was noted that although I do not consider additional conditions to be necessary, "if the applicant wanted to allay all concerns it could consider offering a voluntary limitation on the development or maximum wall-face height of buildings on Lot 122 to further address any perception of adverse effects in relation to the extent of potential DME reflections at the final extent of the approach to runway 02". Whilst I still do not consider such conditions to be necessary, the conditions now proposed by the Applicant provide an additional safeguard and allay any remaining concerns relating to DME, including those raised by Mr Grimm.

Mr Kyle's Evidence

- 13 Throughout his evidence Mr Kyle asserts that the aviation safety related assessments undertaken to date and associated information provided are insufficient and therefore, in his view, it is *'not plausible to conclude that aviation risks are negligible, or even that they have been adequately identified or addressed'*¹.
- 14 However, Mr Kyle does not identify any specific aviation safety effect arising from the proposal, nor does he identify any deficiency in the assessment methodology, assumptions, inputs, or conclusions relied upon by the applicant's aviation experts.
- 15 I understand Mr Kyle's concern to be that the Applicant has not provided sufficient information to provide certainty at the consenting stage.
- 16 As stated in this brief of evidence and in the evidence I have provided to date, the methodology adopted and assessments undertaken by Cyrrus are consistent with industry and international aviation standards and best practice and have been accepted as such by Airways, CIAL and by UK and other European regulatory authorities and airport operators in comparable contexts.

¹ Evidence of John Kyle, 12 March 2026, paragraph 42.

- 17 Finally, I consider that neither the proposed conditions, nor the existence of further processes that may need to be undertaken by Airways or CIAL under its own regulatory framework indicate that aviation safety risk is presently unmanaged, nor does it imply that development approval at this stage is unsafe or premature.

Significance of Effects

- 18 I understand that CIAL and Airways question the *significance* of potential aviation safety effects, insofar that our assessment of 18 November 2025 and evidence to date have concluded such effects will be 'acceptable'.
- 19 'Acceptable' is conservative risk threshold used internationally in aviation guidance and regulation, and it is materially different from a planning judgement about whether an effect is merely tolerable. Our assessment modelled a worst-case scenario and showed minimal potential effects. The actual effects are expected to be less than those predicted by the modelling, therefore I stand by my conclusion that the effects I have assessed are acceptable, in that context.
- 20 In terms of this (Fast Track approvals) process, I understand that the assessment of effects on the environment (AEE) included with the application as originally filed, concluded in its executive summary that the proposal would have '**no more than minor and acceptable actual or potential adverse effects on the environment**².'
- 21 With reference to the classification of effects as set out in Table 1 of the AEE, and accounting for the mitigation or remediation achieved by way of the proposed consent conditions, it is our opinion that any potential adverse effects on air navigation equipment will be '**less than minor**' insofar that they 'are discernible but too small to have any meaningful impact'.


Conclusion

- 22 This further statement reaffirms the conclusions in the assessments and evidence I have provided to date and I remain of the view that any potential effects related to aviation matters will be **acceptable** in an aviation safety context. Moreover, I consider such effects to be **less than minor**. Accordingly, in my opinion, the Panel has sufficient, reliable technical

² Para 17 of AEE, dated 15 April 2025 (See: [.CT-Ryans-Road-FT-AEE-20250320-AMENDED-FINAL_Redacted.pdf](#)).

information before it to identify, evaluate, and weigh aviation safety effects for the purposes of its decision.

Dated 17 March 2026



Simon McPherson