APPENDIX 10

ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT
REDACTED VERSION

MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI

New Zealand Government
Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa

Northland Shipyard and Dry Dock Project

Economic Impact Assessment

17 August 2026

Northland Shipyard and Dry Dock Project

Economic Impact Assessment

Prepared for

The Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE)

PUBLIC VERSION
Certain information has been redacted from this version under section 93(3) of the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024, by reference to the applicable grounds in the Official Information Act 1982. The unredacted report has been provided to the EPA and expert panel.

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Executive Summary

Market Economics has been engaged by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment to assess the economic effects of a proposed shipyard and dry dock facility at Marsden Point, Northland. The Project is a listed project in Schedule 2 of the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024. The purpose of that Act is to facilitate the delivery of infrastructure and development projects with significant regional or national benefits, and this report provides economic evidence relevant to that purpose.

This report assesses the scale, duration, distribution and additionality of the Project's regional and national economic benefits. It does not assess environmental, cultural or other effects, or weigh economic benefits against them. Those matters are addressed in the wider application and are for the Panel to determine.

The capability gap

New Zealand has two permanent dry docks: Devonport and Lyttelton. Both were built in the nineteenth century, and neither can accommodate many of the vessels now operating in New Zealand waters, including the Cook Strait ferries and the Royal New Zealand Navy's two largest vessels. International maritime regulation requires commercial vessels to be inspected out of the water at regular intervals through their working lives; for the vessels that exceed the limits of the existing docks, there is no domestic way to do this. Those operators must travel to Australia or Asia, incurring transit fuel, overseas port costs and extended vessel unavailability, with the maintenance expenditure itself also leaving the New Zealand economy. Access to overseas capacity is determined by commercial and sovereign priorities set outside New Zealand's control.

Regional economic effects

The construction and operational phases of the project are modelled using a multi-regional input-output framework, over a 38-year period including three construction years and 35 operating years. Results are expressed in 2025 prices and, unless stated otherwise, discounted at 8%.

Construction and base-case operations together are estimated to support $1.05 billion of discounted value added across New Zealand, of which approximately $555 million accrues to Northland. Of the estimated 20,802 job years supported nationally, 14,069, or 68%, are in Northland. Discounted household income is estimated to total $552m nationally and $312m in Northland. Construction will support an estimated 1,703 jobs per year across the three-year build; operations support an average of 448 a year, of which around 259 are direct positions.

The regional share is higher in operations than in construction – 63% of operational value added compared with 45% of construction value added – meaning the lasting component of the effect is also the most regionally concentrated. And the effects occur in a region with lower output, incomes and labour utilisation than the national average, in a locality that lost approximately 400 direct jobs when the Marsden Point refinery closed in 2022.

Input-output modelling measures gross economic activity, not net economic benefit. At the regional level, gross activity is a valid approximation of net additional benefit, because Northland has demonstrable

labour-market underutilisation and no facility of this kind currently operates in the region. At the national level it is not, and the national totals above represent the scale of activity supported rather than as a welfare gain.

National economic benefits

National benefits are assessed separately, distinguishing between genuine resource savings and transfers within New Zealand. Several of these streams can be estimated indicatively.

Avoided offshore transit and vessel-unavailability costs have an estimated present value of $80m to $124m. That estimate rests on large-vessel offshore maintenance voyages a year, adopted from the Ministry of Transport's *Northport Dry Dock Supporting the Blue Economy Business Case* (July 2023)[1] as a deliberately conservative floor rather than as a demand or utilisation assumption. The facility's incremental net operating surplus has an estimated present value of a further reflecting additional maintenance activity undertaken in New Zealand rather than paid to overseas facilities.

A further set of benefit streams is material but not monetised. These include resilience and option value, defence maritime capability and strategic resilience, carbon abatement, labour-market benefits where the Project draws on otherwise underutilised labour, and any avoided or deferred expenditure on repairing or replacing existing domestic capability. Their exclusion reflects the absence of a defensible valuation basis at concept stage, not a judgement that they are small. The resilience and defence streams in particular reflect a structural dependence that New Zealand would benefit strongly from alleviating.

Conclusions on significance

The Fast-track Approvals Act does not prescribe quantitative thresholds for significant regional or national benefits, and significance falls to be assessed against the circumstances of the particular project and the economy where it occurs.

In our opinion the Project will deliver significant regional economic benefits to Northland. That conclusion rests on the scale of the modelled effects relative to Northland's economic base, their concentration within the region, their duration across the life of the consent, and their structural relevance to a regional economy with an established productivity deficit. It does not depend on the national benefit estimates in section 5.

In our opinion the Project will also deliver significant national economic benefits. These arise from the domestic capability created where no comparable domestic alternative is presently identified, the avoided offshore transit and vessel-unavailability costs, the maintenance expenditure retained in New Zealand, and the resilience and strategic optionality associated with holding suitable infrastructure domestically.

[1] The 2023 Business Case was prepared while the Project sat with the Ministry of Transport. Responsibility for subsequent Project development has since transferred to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, through Kānoa – Regional Economic Development & Investment Unit.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

New Zealand is heavily dependent on sea trade but lacks suitable domestic dry dock and heavy marine maintenance capacity for many of the larger vessels that support its freight, passenger and nationally significant maritime functions. Large commercial and passenger vessels, including container ships, bulk carriers, roll-on roll-off ferries and tankers must presently travel to overseas for scheduled dry docking, heavy maintenance and repair. International maritime classification requirements are for out-of-water surveys at regular intervals during a vessel's working life. For vessel operators in New Zealand, the absence of a suitable domestic option means travelling to facilities in Australia or Asia because there is no domestic option for vessels above a modest size. In addition to the maintenance work itself, this involves transit fuel, crew time, overseas port costs and additional vessel unavailability. To the extent that relevant maintenance and associated expenditure occur offshore, that activity is also lost to the New Zealand economy.

This specific infrastructure gap has been understood for decades and has become more significant as the size of vessels serving New Zealand's ports are larger than ever and growing. The two existing domestic dry docks, at Lyttelton and Devonport are unable to accommodate many of the larger vessels now operating in New Zealand waters. The limited scale and concentration of existing domestic facilities also reduces maintenance resilience where either facility is unavailable or unsuitable for the vessel concerned.

1.2 Necessity of dry docking

Out-of-water inspection and maintenance recurring requirements for commercial ship operations. International maritime regulations require vessels to enter a dry dock or undergo equivalent surveys at intervals determined by their age and type. For passenger vessels, for example, the maximum interval between any two dry-dock bottom inspections should not exceed 36 months[2]. For New Zealand operators, this means that routine, predictable and unavoidable maintenance requirements result in multi day transits to overseas facilities.

Where dry docking requires a ship to transit to an overseas port, the direct cost of maintenance is compounded by the transit fuel costs, additional crew time at sea, overseas port charges, lost revenue days (unavailability) and any port fees or scheduling premiums. Those displacement costs can be substantial for larger vessels undertaking multi-day trips to Australia or Asia.

In addition, superyachts (defined as recreational vessels over 25m in length) require regular dry docking to maintain insurance cover. This is in addition to refits and regular maintenance. With limited large yacht infrastructure, it has not been possible to carry out much of that work within New Zealand waters, limiting

[2] Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC), 2023. 5.10.1

visitation of high spending visitors[3] to New Zealand. This spending is included as a revenue line in the operational scenarios modelled in Section 4.

1.3 New Zealand's maritime maintenance infrastructure

New Zealand has two permanent dry docks. Both were built in the 19th century and are significantly capacity constrained. Lyttelton dry dock has a practical vessel envelope of approximately 120 metres in length and, 17 metres in width[4][5]. Calliope Dock at Devonport Naval Base is slightly larger – it can handle vessels up to 180m long and 22m wide but remains undersized for most commercial operations[6]. It primarily supports servicing the New Zealand Navy fleet and has limited availability and capacity for larger commercial vessels.

Both dry docks in New Zealand are too small for even the first generation of ships. Figure 1 shows the published physical dimensions of the docks. The vessel classes that can be accepted depend on vessel configuration and operating requirements. The 2023 Business Case applied a more conservative practical envelope for Lyttelton of approximately 120 metres length and 17 metres beam.

Figure 1 – Dry dock capacity relative to selected vessel sizes[7]



	TEU	LENGTH	BEAM	DRAUGHT
Lyttelton Dry Dock	N/A	120 m	17 m	2 m
Calliope Dock	N/A	180 m	22 m	11 m
First generation containership c. 1972	1,500	225 m	24.5 m	9 m
Ultra-large containership c. 2015	21,000	400 m	59 m	16 m

Calliope Dock opened in 1888 and is subject to the constraints associated with its age, dimensions, location and primary naval function. Projected sea level rises are also anticipated to be problematic by 2035[8]. More broadly, the Devonport Naval Base is subject to a reducing footprint, rising land values and therefore encroachment of residential land on its perimeter. Calliope is therefore not seen as a long-term solution for New Zealand's naval and small-scale maintenance capability. The 2023 Business Case notes the material

[3] On average a superyacht will spend $3.8m per visit to New Zealand, Market Economics Research caried out for NZ Marine, 2024
[4] Our Services – Lyttelton Port Company
[5] Northport Dry Dock Business Case – PwC (2023)
[6] Northport Dry Dock Business Case – PwC (2023)
[7] ME Analysis of Container Ship Size and Port Relocation – International Transport Forum; OECD. Figure 4
[8] Socioeconomic Impacts of Northport Expansion on Te Tai Tokerau/Northland – Polis Consulting Group (p42)

constraints around the Calliope facility. Those matters reinforce the strategic value of additional domestic servicing capability on the North Island.

1.4 Cost of the gap

Calliope dock cannot accommodate many of the larger vessels on which New Zealand's freight, energy and inter-island connectivity depend. The Cook Strait ferries provide a clear illustration of the practical and economic consequences of this capability gap. All four ferries currently operating on the Strait – two (KiwiRail) Interislander and two Bluebridge – exceed the Calliope dock's dimension limits.[9][10][11] In 2026, Kaitaki is scheduled to travel to Singapore for maintenance , involving approximately 14 days' transit in each direction, including a fuel stop in Australia.[12] The 2023 Business Case estimated the fuel cost of a return voyage to Singapore at approximately in 2024 prices, compared with approximately for a return voyage to Sydney. These figures exclude the maintenance work itself, overseas port charges, additional crew costs and the economic cost of vessel unavailability.

The Government's Cook Strait ferry replacement programme will introduce two new rail-enabled ferries from 2029[13]. Each vessel will be approximately 200 metres long and 28 metres wide and will have intended 30-year operating life[14]. The two replacement vessels will carry passengers together with road and rail vehicles and are therefore expected to operate as ro-ro passenger ships. Under the IMO's HSSC survey guidelines, at least two inspections of a passenger ship's bottom in each five-year survey period should ordinarily be conducted in dry dock, with no more than 36 months between dry-dock inspections[15]. The relaxation to one dry-dock inspection applies only to passenger ships that are not ro-ro passenger ships. Across the vessels' expected 30-year operating lives, this indicates approximately 22–24 post-delivery dry-dockings across the two vessels, subject to their final classification and approved survey arrangements.

The ferry example does not represent the full potential market for the facility, but illustrates the recurring offshore transit costs, vessel downtime and loss of domestic expenditure that arise from the existing infrastructure gap.

1.5 Global context

New Zealand's international shipping services are predominantly provided by overseas-owned carriers, reflecting the country's relatively small cargo volumes and distance from major east-west shipping routes. This is highlighted in the Government's Freight and Supply Chain Strategy, with the reasons cited being small cargo volumes and distance from the main East-West shipping routes[16]. When New Zealand-based

[9] Kaiārahi Dimensions – Vessel finder (Beam = 25m)
[10] Kaitaki Statistics – Interislander (Length = 181m)
[11] Our Ships – Bluebridge Cook Strait Ferries (Lengths = 186.5)
[12] Kaitaki heading to dry dock in Singapore – Interislander
[13] Cook Strait Ferry Replacement Programme – Kiwirail
[14] Ferries Replacement Work Programme Information Release – The Treasury (March 2026)
[15] International Maritime Organization, Resolution A.1207(34), *Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC), 2025*, cls 5.10.1–5.10.2.
[16] Aotearoa New Zealand Freight and Supply Chain Strategy – Te Manatū Waka Ministry of Transport (2023). Page 47.

vessels require maintenance, due to the lack of local facilities, they must compete with an international shipyard market in which scheduling and commercial priorities are determined outside New Zealand.

The strategic case for greater domestic maritime maintenance capacity has been reinforced by a period of unusual volatility in global shipping. There have been successive disruptions in recent years. The Covid-19 pandemic and the vulnerability of major chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, have demonstrated how quickly the global trading system can be destabilised when port capacity is tight and route options are constrained. The disruptions have contributed to congestion, increased freight rates, punitive fees being charged on idle cargo[17] and reduced certainty over the availability and timing of maritime services. New Zealand vessels requiring survey or maintenance are therefore reliant on an international shipyard market that is increasingly congested, expensive and subject to geopolitical, sovereign and commercial pressures.

Climate change also contributes to exposure, as highlighted in the Freight and Supply Chain Strategy[18]. Extreme weather events of early 2023, most notably Cyclone Gabrielle, damaged freight infrastructure and triggered a national state of emergency. This included rail connection to Napier Port being unavailable for seven months[19]. In response, a coastal vessel was used to temporarily move freight between Gisborne and Napier for onward shipment while land routes were repaired[20]. This demonstrates the substitution role coastal shipping can perform when land networks fail. That role depends on vessels being available when needed, however.

As extreme events become more frequent or severe, the value of having vessels available to support alternative freight movements – and domestic capacity to maintain and return those vessels to service – will increase. Greater domestic maintenance capacity would strengthen one of the supporting conditions for a resilient coastal shipping system, particularly where maritime services are relied on during disruption to road or rail networks.

Collectively, these factors mean that continued reliance on overseas maintenance exposes New Zealand vessel operators to costs, scheduling and capacity decisions that are substantially outside domestic control.

1.6 Code of conduct

While this assessment and application is not before the Environment Court, this report has been prepared and reviewed in accordance with the Environment Court's Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses, contained in the Environment Court Practice Note 2023. Other than where it is stated that reliance is placed on the advice of another person, the author(s) confirm that the issues addressed in this report are within their area of expertise. The author(s) have not omitted consideration of any material facts known to them that might alter or detract from the opinions expressed.

[17] The Global Scramble for Ports – The Economist (2026)

[18] Aotearoa New Zealand Freight and Supply Chain Strategy – Te Manatū Waka Ministry of Transport (2023). Page 21, 31, 34, 46, 49

[19] Rail connection to Napier Port resumed after a seven-month outage cause by Cyclone Gabrielle – Railmarket

[20] One year on from Cyclone Gabrielle – Napier Port (2024)

The author of this report, **Tom Harris** (BSc/MSc Economics), Senior Consultant at Market Economics. Tom has 3 years' experience at Market Economics, during which time he has carried out a number of economic assessments for FTAA applications (a comprehensive listing is contained in Section 8 – CVs), as well as policy work, macroeconomic and industry analysis for private and public sector clients. Prior to joining M.E, Tom worked in the UK Civil Service in 2023 as an economist across a challenging portfolio of projects and sectors. During the Covid-19 pandemic he was the principal analyst in the Department for Education modelling the pandemic's impacts on Children's Social Care. His other roles included leading on graduate outcomes analysis, supporting high-profile national policy implementation, being embedded in the permanent secretary's office, and working closely with external academics and stakeholders.

The report has been reviewed by **Greg Akehurst** (BA Geography/BCom. Economics), Director Market Economics, RMLA, NZ Association of Economists. Greg has 30 years' experience in economic consulting, 25 years as Director of Market Economics Ltd. During this time, he has carried out numerous assessments of economic benefits and effects of developments and projects such as proposed by Southern Screenworks. In recent years he has carried out a number of economic assessments under the FTAA and has acted as reviewer for Councils and others. Greg's CV is included in Section 8– Authors' CVs.

2 The proposed facility and site

2.1 Site rationale

The case for Marsden Point as the location for a national ship maintenance facility is well-established and rests on structural advantages that no other established New Zealand port can replicate. Previous assessments have extensively considered potential locations for a national ship maintenance facility and have identified a location at Marsden Point, immediately adjacent to the existing Northport facility, as suitable for a range of reasons, as highlighted below.

The site has deep-water access to Whangārei Harbour and is adjacent to an established commercial port, with an approach channel capable of receiving large vessels. Marine space and land is available to the west/southwest of the existing Northport facility for a facility of this type. The wider Marsden Point area hosts a functioning marine services cluster, which means that some parts of the supply chain, skills base and supporting businesses a dry dock operation needs already exist nearby. And it has existing or planned road and rail infrastructure, electricity and water supply adequate for heavy industrial operations. It is proximate to potential labour sources in Whangārei, wider Northland, and in Auckland.

While a range of other potential locations for a national ship maintenance facility were considered, including Lyttelton, Wellington, Auckland and Tauranga, each face constraints.

2.2 The proposed facility

The proposed facility has been designed to a concept stage. The precise configuration of the proposed facility will be subject to a later detailed design phase. This is standard practice for large infrastructure projects, where many engineering, materials availability, funding and cost variables exist. For example, the concept design accommodates either a floating dry dock or a ship lift as the vessel-lifting technology. Dry docks and ship lifts are distinct. A dry dock holds one ship at a time while work is carried out, whereas a ship lift raises a vessel out of the water, so it can be moved to a hardstand area onshore. The concept design has been carefully developed to provide for either of these ship lift mechanisms to be used. This will allow sufficient information to be provided to enable consenting. The assumed capacity is 3 ship slots with an average utilisation of slots. Detailed design parameters will be confirmed following consenting. For the purposes of this assessment, we have adopted the facility, capacity, cost and operating assumptions identified in sections 4 and 5.

2.3 Integration with prior assessments

There is an existing body of prior work informing this assessment. We have drawn on it selectively to understand the economic context, magnitude of estimated effects and methodological considerations. It

is important to acknowledge that the proposed configuration of the shipyard and dry dock facility, while fundamentally similar, has evolved. Notwithstanding, the estimates and assumptions utilised in that earlier analysis provide a useful basis for a derived analysis.

The 2023 Business Case assessed graving dock, floating dry dock, ship lift and slipway options and identified a floating dry dock as the preferred technology for the configuration, design criteria and site assumptions assessed at that stage. The current FTAA concept design reflects subsequent design development and accommodates either a floating dry dock or ship lift. The demand assessment within the 2023 Business Case used a 2023 Thompson Clarke demand study in conjunction with direct engagement with vessel operators. The relevance of the earlier demand and utilisation assumptions therefore depends on the transferability of the assumptions in that report, notably those concerning vessel demand, servicing activity and technology-specific capacity. The 2023 Business Case concluded that "there is sufficient economic and strategic value potential to merit progressing the case" to the next development stage.

An earlier 2022 Polis Consulting Group report, commissioned by Northland Inc, estimated the dry dock and shipyard (combined) at $290 million additional GDP per annum and 1,135 jobs by 2060 at the mid-case, inclusive of significant marine cluster and naval relocation effects. The direct dry dock contribution was estimated at approximately $54 million GDP and 270 jobs. Subsequent Project development work undertaken by MBIE indicates that the employment estimate is conservative, with the facility expected to support an operational workforce of up to approximately 500 FTE, depending on utilisation, work programme and the mix of employees, contractors and tenant businesses. Results are reported as decade averages in 2022 dollars. Cluster and naval effects account for the majority of the headline figures, which are conditional on separate policy decisions and private investment choices.

The results therefore provide an assessment of the scale and distribution of economic effects under the stated assumptions.

The information available to this assessment comprises high-level capital cost figures, operational cost and revenue assumptions and prior published and redacted analysis described above. Regional GDP and employment effects are driven by activity type and value, which itself depends on configuration, capacity and capture rates. The construction phase impacts have the most robust input base, as they are derived from the capital cost figures provided.

In our opinion, the evidence base is nonetheless sufficient for the purpose of assessing the scale and significance of economic benefits. The limitations discussed throughout the report affect the confidence attributable to particular figures but not the conclusions.

3 Northland economic context

Northland's economic context is relevant to the significance and distribution of the Project's regional effects. In particular, the region combines persistently lower output and incomes, labour-market underutilisation, the loss of a major industrial employer at Marsden Point, and an existing concentration of marine, port and construction activity on which the Project can build.

3.1 Overview

Northland is among New Zealand's lower-income and lower-output regions. Real GDP per capita was $53,000 in 2025, compared with a national average of $81,000 – a gap of 35%[21]. Te margin has widened over time. In 2000, national real GDP per capita was 23% above Northland's, meaning the region has been losing ground relative to the rest of the country. Northland's real GDP per capita has also declined in recent years. In 2019, it stood at $55,000 (2025 prices) but has fallen 4.0% over the 6 years to 2025 and is now below $53,000[22].

These indicators provide the regional context for assessing the significance of the Project's employment, household income and value added effects, rather than determining that significance on their own.

3.2 Productivity

Measured by GDP per worker, Northland is close to or above the national average in several of its largest sectors but falls short in most broad industries. Figure 2 shows GDP per industry across ANZSIC level 1 industry codes ordered by the relative shortfall between Northland and New Zealand. While this data does not enable a granular analysis of sectors such as ship repair or boat building, it enables a high-level consideration of Northland's relative strengths. The proportional size of the gap is summarised in Figure 3, highlighting that transport, postal and warehousing is 20% above the national average, making it one of the region's clearest productivity strengths. This category includes marine and port services employment including 'water freight transport', port and 'water terminal operations' and 'stevedoring services'. Manufacturing records GDP per worker broadly in line with the national average. The category includes transport-equipment and repair activities relevant to the Project, although the aggregate result does not separately identify the productivity of marine repair and maintenance activities.

The largest productivity shortfalls are concentrated in mining (-89%), information media and telecommunications (-63%) and electricity, gas, water and waste services (-61%). The figures for these sectors are warped slightly by small denominators (mining employs less than 200 workers in Northland), but overall industry employment shares are quite similar to New Zealand as a whole: the largest difference

[21] Regional Economic Profile Tool – Infometrics (accessed 05/06/2026)

[22] Infometrics GDP data adjusted for inflation with RBNZ deflator series

between a given industry's share of workers in Northland compared with New Zealand as a whole is 4 percentage points (see Figure 7).

Figure 2 - GDP per worker by industry – Northland vs New Zealand



Source: Infometrics 2025 sectoral GDP estimates; Market Economics analysis of Stats NZ employment data

Figure 3 - Northland GDP per worker relative to the national average, by industry



Another important point is that because the industry-level productivity gaps are much smaller than the 35% per capita gap, the shortfall is more likely to be attributable to the region's industry composition (a larger share of employment in low value added sectors) and/or labour utilisation (a smaller share of the population in work or working shorter hours). Accordingly, sustained additional employment and activity in comparatively productive sectors can improve regional output both by increasing labour utilisation and by shifting activity towards higher-value industries.

3.3 Labour market underutilisation

Northland's unemployment rate was 6.1% in 2025, against 5.0% nationally (Figure 4). The gap was narrow between 2021 and 2022, coinciding with low rates across New Zealand, but subsequently reopened as conditions loosened. This suggests that labour demand is thin and workers might be among the first released when national conditions worsen.

Labour-market underutilisation is particularly evident among younger people. In 2025, 19.1% of Northland's 15 – 24-year-olds were not in employment, education or training, compared with 12.9%

nationally (Figure 5)[23]. The Northland rate has exceeded the national rate throughout the period shown, and the 2025 reading is the second highest in the series.

Figure 4 - Annual unemployment rate, Northland vs New Zealand, 2015 - 2025



[23] The Household Labour Force Survey is used in conjunction with Census data, Jobseeker Support recipients by age, and transient secondary school student numbers. Caution should be applied when interpreting year-on-year movements due to potential sampling errors in the survey rather than actual fundamental change.

Figure 5 - Youth (15 - 24) not in employment, education or training (NEET); 2016 - 2025



The relevance to this assessment is that the Project would create sustained demand for engineering, construction, marine and supporting occupations in a region with demonstrable labour-market underutilisation. Realising the regional employment benefit will nevertheless require recruitment, training and skills-development pathways, because the available labour-market capacity will not necessarily match the Project's occupational requirements from the outset.

3.4 Distributional relevance for Māori

Māori comprise a substantially larger share of Northland's population than of New Zealand's as a whole: 37.4% of the usually resident population are Māori according to the 2023 census, compared with a national average of 17.8%[24]. For the year ended March 2026, the estimated Māori unemployment rate in Northland was 10.8%, while the Māori employment rate was 53.4%[25].

Median weekly income across all ethnic groups in Northland was $632 in 2025, 34% below the national median of $959. Although this measure is not ethnicity-specific, it confirms the wider regional income disadvantage within which Māori labour-market outcomes occur. Māori are therefore disproportionately represented in a region with comparatively weak income and labour-utilisation outcomes.

The Project's sustained employment, skills and supplier opportunities therefore have particular distributional relevance for Māori in Northland. The extent to which those opportunities are realised will

[24] Infometrics 2023 Census analyser.

[25] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Māori Labour Market Statistics Snapshot – March 2026 (11 May 2026), Northland regional results, based on Stats NZ Household Labour Force Survey data.

depend on occupational fit, accessible recruitment and training pathways, workforce development and the regional distribution of employment and contracting opportunities.

This distribution has implications for the value of well-paid employment located in Northland. Whether those economic opportunities are realised by Māori, including mana whenua communities, will depend on the settings described above. Cultural values, effects and mana whenua interests in the Project area are addressed in the relevant cultural, engagement and planning material and are not treated in this report as economic benefits.

3.5 The closure of Marsden Point oil refinery

The Whangārei area's economic structure has been reshaped by the closure of the Marsden Point oil refinery, which ceased refining in 2022 and now operates as an import and distribution fuel terminal under Channel Infrastructure.

The refinery was an anchor of Northland's manufacturing sector. Employment data for the Marsden Point locality[26] show petroleum refining supporting around 400 jobs from 2015 to 2020, with no employment recorded under that industry classification from 2023 following the end of refining operations (Figure 6). Manufacturing employment rose to around 350 jobs between 2018 and 2020 before dropping off to around 200, and transport and warehousing has been at 300 or above since 2023. The types of jobs associated with the refinery are difficult to generate without a deliberate investment decision. The proposed facility could contribute to filling the gap in the regional employment market created by the refinery closing.

[26] The Statistical Area 1 (SA1) around the refinery is 7030218, SA1 is the smallest level of granularity available.

Figure 6 - Modified Employment Count (MEC) by selected industry, Marsden Point, 2015 - 2025



3.6 Industrial structure

Northland's industrial structure reflects its natural-resource base, coastal location, construction activity and proximity to Auckland. Location quotients provide one measure of the industries in which regional employment is more or less concentrated than the national average. Figure 7 shows Northland's location quotient by industry relative to New Zealand. This describes how concentrated industries are, by dividing the industry's share of regional employment by its share of national employment[27].

The region has strong representation in 'agriculture, forestry and fishing' (LQ 1.6), 'electricity, gas, water and waste services' (1.5), 'health care and social assistance' (1.3) and 'construction' (1.3). It is under-represented in services that drive productivity growth nationally: 'financial and insurance services' (0.4), 'information media and telecommunications' (0.4) and 'professional, scientific and technical services' (0.6). Some specialist services used by Northland businesses may also be supplied from Auckland, although the location-quotient data do not measure those interregional service relationships directly.

[27] A location quotient above 1.0 indicates that the industry accounts for a larger share of employment in Northland is more than New Zealand on average ; a value below 1.0 indicates a smaller share.

Figure 7 - Location Quotient by Industry, MEC 2025



Against this broader industrial backdrop, Northland has a good concentration of relevant marine industry relative to the rest of New Zealand. Core marine industries in the region have a location quotient of 3.3, more than three times the national concentration (Figure 8). Widening the boundary to include marine services reduces the quotient to 2.2, and adding port logistics reduces it further to 2.0.

This demonstrates that the region is at least twice as marine-specialised as New Zealand as a whole, which provides a relevant base on which the Project can build, but does not mean that Northland already has specialist heavy-ship maintenance capability or sufficient workforce capacity for the Project at full operation. Existing boatbuilding and marine employment is likely to be concentrated in smaller-vessel activity and is not wholly transferable to heavy-vessel maintenance. Nevertheless, the region's existing marine specialisation means the Project would deepen and extend an established area of economic activity rather than create an entirely new industry in a location with no relevant capability base.

Figure 8 - Marine industries location quotient, MEC 2025



Taken together, Northland combines persistently lower output and incomes, demonstrable labour-market underutilisation and the recent loss of a major industrial anchor with an existing concentration of marine, port, manufacturing and construction activity. The Project would therefore introduce sustained higher-value industrial activity into a region with both capacity to benefit and a relevant base on which to build. Workforce development, specialist recruitment and supplier capability will be required, but those requirements form part of the Project's regional capability effect rather than negating it. This context supports the regional significance of the value-added, employment and household-income effects assessed in Section 4.

4 Economic impact analysis

4.1 Purpose and scope

Section 3 of the FTAA states that the purpose of the Act is to facilitate the delivery of infrastructure and development projects with significant regional or national benefits. The project is a listed project in Schedule 2 of the FTAA. In this context, the focus of this report is to assess the project's economic contribution and assist the panel in understanding the project's regional or national benefits. This section focusses on the regional benefits by measuring the scale, distribution and duration of the economic activity supported by the Project in Northland and the rest of New Zealand.

A Multi-Region Input-Output (MRIO) model is used to estimate the value added, employment and household income associated with a defined pattern of expenditure. It makes no adjustment for what the resources used would otherwise have produced. The results therefore describe gross economic activity, not net economic benefit. Because of the conditions explained in Section 3 and lack of equivalent existing facility, a substantial share of the employment generated would plausibly draw on labour that is not fully utilised at present, or attract it from elsewhere. At the regional level, therefore, a reasonable share of gross activity would represent net additional benefit, subject to constraints recorded throughout this section. The question of national benefits is addressed in section 5.

4.2 Headline findings

Table 1 summarises the outputs from this section. More detail including regional breakdowns and profiles over time are explained in the relevant sub-sections that follow.

Table 1: Summary of Input-output model estimates

Measure	Construction + base operations	Northland value	Northland share
Discounted value added	$1.05bn	$555m	45% during construction; 63% during operations
Employment years (MECs)	20,802	14,069	68%
Ongoing annual employment	1,703 during construction; 448 during operations	895 during construction; 325 during operations	53% during construction; 73% during operations
Discounted household income	$552m	$312m	57%

4.3 Approach

The Project will generate economic activity through two distinct phases. The construction phase will involve several years of civil, marine and building works, including reclamation, dredging, berthage, hardstand and landside facilities, together with construction or installation of the selected vessel-lifting technology. The expenditure associated with these works will generate direct activity at the Project site and further activity through New Zealand supply chains.

Market Economics understands that specialised components of the vessel-lifting system will be imported, while a material proportion of fabrication construction activity will occur in New Zealand. There is also construction of the landside facilities which include the hardstand and wharves, sheds and buildings for specialist activities (machinery shops, paint booths etc), office buildings for, management, administration and design type activities.

Once operational, the facility will generate ongoing activity through vessel servicing, repair, maintenance and refit, together with demand for subcontractors, suppliers and supporting services. Unlike the time-limited construction effects, these operational effects continue over the modelled operating period.

For both phases (construction and operation), the impacts are wider than simply to activity occurring at the facility. All industries involved purchase raw materials, goods and services from their supply chains. This sustains further rounds of activity and impacts that are often far wider than the region. Finally, all workers engaged either directly or indirectly in the construction or operation of the facility, are paid wages and salaries. They then spend a portion of this income on goods and services, repay mortgages and save the balance. This generates an induced impact on the wider economy.

These economic impacts are estimated using a Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) model of the New Zealand economy. The model uses 109 industries across four regions – Northland, Auckland, the rest of the North Island and the South Island – and captures interregional trade flows, so that expenditure initiated at Marsden Point can be traced through supply chains. The three effects are reported as follows:

- Direct effects reflect the activity of the firms building or operating the facility itself.
- Indirect effects arise from upstream demand on suppliers – steel and fabrication, plant hire, engineering consultancy, freight etc.
- Induced effects arise from the re-spending of household income earned in the direct and indirect activity.

Results are reported on two measures. Value added (VA) measures payments to the factors of production net of intermediate purchases, (It is the industry-level analogue of GDP.) Employment is measured in Modified Employee Count (MEC) job years, which account for both employees and working proprietors.

The MRIO is derived from the Stats NZ 2019-20 supply-use tables. The economic structure is updated from that base year using industry-specific Producers Price Index movements, which re-price each industry's

input requirements. The cost structure therefore reflects both the general change in input prices since 2019-20 and the divergence in price movement between industries over that period. Project expenditure is entered in 2025 prices and outputs are all reported in this price year.

Value added is reported in real terms and discounted at 8% per annum, in line with Treasury guidance for commercial proposals, with a 2% rate reported as a sensitivity[28][29][30]. Discounting is the means by which monetised effects can be meaningfully compared through time based on rate of time preference. Employment is not discounted; job years are summed across the modelled period. These discounted activity totals are present-value reporting measures and are not estimates of net social welfare benefit.

4.4 Scenarios modelled

Three scenarios were run over a 38-year horizon covering three years of construction (assumed 2027–29) and 35 years of operation (2030–64). The 35-year operational horizon is aligned with the assumed consent life:

- **Scenario 1** – Construction. Capital expenditure to build the facility.
- **Scenario 2** – Base case operations. Ongoing operational revenue at the assumed utilisation of [redacted] of three ship slots.
- **Scenario 3** – Optimistic operations. Higher throughput at the facility, holding all other assumptions constant.

Scenarios 2 and 3 are alternatives, not additive. Construction plus base-case operations is treated as the central result throughout.

4.4.1 Construction expenditure

The current estimated total project costs are approximately [redacted] The domestic expenditure component of capital costs is estimated at [redacted] in nominal terms, spread evenly across the three construction years[31]. The offshore component and client-side technical roles are excluded from the direct New Zealand expenditure shock, except to the extent that associated domestic transport, installation, margin or support expenditure is separately included.

[28] Discount Rates – The New Zealand Treasury

[29] Treasury Circular 2024/15: Updated public sector discount rates for Cost Benefit Analysis – The New Zealand Treasury

[30] CBAx Tool User Guidance – The New Zealand Treasury

[31] An even split of expenditure has been adopted from data provided by PwC and draws from the 2023 Business Case. It is a modelling simplification.

4.4.2 Operational revenue

Operational activity is modelled as a demand shock to two Northland industries: transport equipment manufacturing, which is where ship repair and maintenance sits in the IO classification, and water transport, which includes the towage and vessel-handling component. The base case begins at in the first full year of operation and reaches by 2064 in nominal terms, averaging a year and totalling over 35 years. In real terms the profile grows by around across the period. The optimistic case is approximately higher on averag averaging a year and in total. The difference is entirely in the ship repair numbers, with water transport held constant across the two scenarios.

Because the operational shock is facility revenue, the modelled results describe the scale of economic activity supported, not the net national benefit of the facility. A substantial share of the revenue represents work that New Zealand operators currently purchase in Australia or Asia, and that share is genuinely additional to the New Zealand economy. A small share could represent work displaced from Devonport, Lyttelton or existing New Zealand marine services providers, which is not net additional to New Zealand as a whole.

Because the facility does not currently exist in Northland, most direct operational activity would be new to the region. Northland's labour-market conditions, including an available labour pool, together with its existing marine, manufacturing, construction and port activity, provide a strong base of relevant and transferable capability. With appropriate workforce planning, recruitment and supplier development, most of the direct operational activity and a substantial share of the wider effects are expected to be realised within Northland.

While the actual net regional effect will depend on the extent to which labour, suppliers and other resources are drawn away from existing Northland activities, the cross over between existing industrial sectors are those skillsets required at the facility may be low.

4.5 Value added

Construction and base-case operations together are estimated to generate **$1.05 billion of discounted value added over 38-year modelled period in present-value terms at an 8% discount rate and in 2025 prices**. Construction accounts for $590 million of this and base-case operations for $462 million. Under the optimistic operating case the operational contribution rises to $642 million and the combined total to $1.23 billion.

Figure 9 - Discounted value added by scenario and effect type



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Value added discounted at 8%

In the construction phase, direct value added is $157 million and total value added is $590 million. This highlights that construction activity draws heavily on domestic supply chains (material supply, construction services, energy etc are all highly domestic in production).

4.5.1 Regional distribution

Northland captures the largest share of value added in every scenario, and a larger share from operations than from construction. Construction activity is distributed more widely because a proportion of specialist engineering, professional services and major infrastructure supply-chain activity is sourced from Auckland and elsewhere in New Zealand. Under base case operations, 63% of national value added accrues to Northland, compared with 45% during construction.

Figure 10 - Discounted value added by region and scenario



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Value added discounted at 8%

Figure 11 - Share of discounted value added by region



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Value added discounted at 8%

4.5.2 Distribution over time

Discounting concentrates the value added in the early years of the project. Construction value added is delivered in three years so is minimally affected by the discount rate. Because operational value added accrues over 35 years, later-year activity receives a much lower present-value weighting, even where the annual real level of activity is higher than in the early operating years. The underlying annual activity remains economically relevant; the difference reflects the discounting convention rather than a reduction in the real scale of later operations.

Figure 12 - Discounted value added by project year and effect type



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Value added discounted at 8%

4.6 Employment

Construction and base case operations together support employment equivalent to 20,802 job years across New Zealand over the 38-year period, of which 14,069 job year equivalents (68%) are in Northland. Under the optimistic operating case, the national total rises to 26,618 job years. These estimates are based on the ratio of employment to industry spending in economic industry classifications and the 2019-20 national supply-use tables. The estimate is therefore sensitive to whether the facility's construction and operations differ in their labour intensity or proportional unit costs compared with the industry averages used.

Figure 13 - Cumulative employment supported by region: Construction and base-case operations



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Employment is not discounted; job-years are the sum of annual MEC.

The job creation profile of the two phases is very different. Construction supports a large but short-lived employment spike, peaking at 1,736 MECs in the first year and averaging 1,703 a year across the three-year build. Operations support a smaller but sustained employment base: an average of 448 job years in the base case (annually), of which around 259 are direct positions, rising to approximately 470 by the end of the consent period as real throughput grows. Across the 35-year operational period, the annual base case effects accumulate to 15,694 job years, of which 9,064 are direct. The optimistic case averages 614 job years on average per year, with around 352 of those direct.

Figure 14 - Total employment supported by year



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Employment is not discounted.

Figure 15 - Average Annual Employment



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Employment is averaged over the years each scenario generates activity.

4.7 Household incomes

Household income is estimated within the model as compensation of employees plus 10% of gross operating surplus (estimated as owner returns paid to households). Construction generates $302 million of discounted household income nationally, of which $143 million accrues to Northland households. Base-

case operations generate a further $250 million nationally and $169 million in Northland; the optimistic case generates $349 million and $237 million respectively.

Figure 16 - Household income effects



Northland's share of household income is higher in the operational phase (68%) than in the construction phase (47%) for the same reason as with value added: operational employment is located at the facility, whereas construction draws labour and services from a wider national base. Median weekly income in Northland is 34% below the national median. The concentration of household-income effects in a region with incomes materially below the national median strengthens the regional significance of the Project's distributional effects.

4.8 Industry distribution

The modelled value-added effects are distributed across a wide range of industries. Figure 17 shows the 12 industries with the largest shares of value added under construction plus base-case operations.

Figure 17 - Top 12 industries ranked by value added[33]



Source: Market Economics MRIO model. Value added discounted at 8%

Transport equipment manufacturing records the largest value added effect at $188 million. Most of this effect is direct because ship repair and maintenance activity is allocated to this industry within the input-output classification. Construction services ($128 million) and heavy and civil engineering construction ($45 million) reflect the build phase and ongoing maintenance work. Fabricated metal product manufacturing ($43 million) and scientific, architectural and engineering services ($32 million) show supply chain impacts in supporting industries.

4.9 Sensitivity to the discount rate

The discount rate has a large effect on the present value of long-lived operational activity, but little effect on the near-term construction results. Because construction expenditure occurs within three years, the construction result only diverges slightly: $590 million at 8% and $623 million at 2%. The operational results are, however, far more sensitive because they are spread over 35 years. Value added from base case operations rises from $462 million at 8% to $1.12 billion at 2%, and the optimistic case from $642 million to $1.56 billion. Combined with construction, the central result ranges from $1.05 billion to $1.74 billion depending on the rate applied. This demonstrates that the Project's cumulative economic effects are driven

[33] Owner-occupied property operation ($68.1m), residential property operation ($19.7m) and non-residential property operation ($19.2m) are excluded because these don't constitute industries that 'benefit'.

primarily by sustained operation over the facility's life, while the construction phase produces a larger but time-limited effect.

Figure 18 - Total value added by scenario at 8% and 2% discount rates

Source: Market Economics MRIO model.

4.10 Interpretation and limitations

The results above describe the scale and distribution of economic activity that the project would support. The modelling demonstrates the scale, duration and distribution of economic activity supported by the Project through spending and revenue. In interpreting those results, it is important to distinguish gross economic impacts from net additional regional and national benefits and to recognise the assumptions inherent in input-output modelling. Four qualifications are important.

- The outputs are gross activity estimates. Input-output modelling measures the activity associated with a given expenditure, with no adjustment for what that expenditure or those resources would have done otherwise. At the regional level this is a reasonable approximation, because Northland has demonstrable labour market slack and share of the modelled activity is plausibly additional to the region. At the national level it is not: absent an explicit additionality assumption, the national figures should be read as the gross scale of activity supported, with the net national gain confined to the import-substitution component and to any productivity or resilience gains not captured in the model.
- We assume a fixed structure and no supply constraints. The model assumes constant returns to scale and unconstrained input supply. The MRIO is derived from the Stats NZ 2019-20 supply-use tables, with each industry's input requirements re-priced using industry-specific Producers Price Index movements. The cost structure therefore reflects both the general change in input prices since 2019-20 and the divergence in price movements between industries over that period. Project expenditure is entered in 2025 prices and all outputs are reported in that price year. Importantly, the re-pricing process does not alter the underlying volume relationships: the economic linkages and

industry characteristics are those observed 2019-20. For example, Northland's transport equipment manufacturing sector is weighted towards small-vessel activity and may not reflect the labour intensity or specialist occupational mix of a large shipyard and dry dock facility. Actual spending and employment between industries and regions may therefore differ from the modelled estimates depending on factors including vessel-lifting technology, degree of automation, work mix, workforce development, and the extent to which specialist labour is recruited from outside Northland.

- The model inputs are assumptions and not confirmed spend or revenue figures. The construction and operational results depend on the capital-cost, domestic-expenditure, utilisation, revenue and operating assumptions supplied for the current Project. They originate in high-level options analysis, drawing on inputs from several engineering and cost consultancies. While that analysis was not audited and assumptions have not been independently tested, the outputs are suitable for use as modelling inputs into this assessment. We have modelled the figures as provided and have not independently verified them. Construction results more directly linked to the current capital-cost estimate, while operational results are more sensitive to long-term demand, utilisation, revenue and labour-intensity assumptions.

- Comparability with prior work. Market Economics has considered the previous assessments of the economic contribution of a Northland shipyard and dry dock facility. The base case from our modelling suggests that the facility might support 259 direct jobs per annum, broadly consistent with the 270 estimated in the 2022 Polis dry dock analysis, noting that the headline figures in that assessment are affected by marine cluster formation and naval relocation effects that are conditional on separate policy and private investment decisions and are outside this scope. Subsequent Project development work undertaken by MBIE indicates that these estimates are conservative, with the facility expected to support an operational workforce of up to approximately 500 FTE. The figures are not directly equivalent. Our modelled estimate is an annual average derived from industry expenditure relationships, whereas the Project estimate reflects anticipated on-site workforce requirements and may include contractors and tenant businesses. Together, they indicate a sustained direct employment base of approximately 260 positions, with substantially higher employment during periods of greater facility activity

The modelling indicates that the Project will support economic activity of substantial scale and duration. Under the central case, construction and operation support $1.05 billion of discounted value added and 20,802 job years nationally over the modelled period. Most of the employment, and a large share of the value added and household income, accrues to Northland – a region with lower output, incomes and labour utilisation than the national average. The regional effects are therefore significant in scale and are sustained beyond the construction phase, throughout the facility's operational life. At the national level, these figures describe gross activity supported; the extent of net national benefit is considered through additionality, avoided offshore expenditure and wider benefit streams in the sections that follow.

5 Assessment of National Benefits

Section 4 measures the scale and distribution of regional economic activity that the project would support. This section considers the extent to which that activity, together with avoided offshore costs and wider capability and resilience effects, represents additional economic benefit to New Zealand. It identifies the national benefit streams that can be estimated from the available evidence, distinguishes transfers from net additional benefits and records material benefit streams that cannot presently be monetised. It does not constitute a complete cost-benefit analysis or derive a benefit-cost ratio.

5.1 What the input-output results measure

Input-output modelling estimates the economic activity that a defined stimulus of construction and operating expenditure supports across the economy. It helps to explain how much value added, employment and household income is associated with the expenditure and where it might land.

A complete cost-benefit analysis would require a consistent assessment of all material costs and benefits relative to the counterfactual. That analysis has not been undertaken for this report. Instead, the national economic effects of the Project are classified below as gross economic activity, net additional benefits or transfers within New Zealand:

- Gross economic activity is the value added, employment and household income sustained by project expenditure. It is relevant to the regional benefit question and to the statutory tests in Section 6. Gross activity is not a welfare gain and is therefore excluded from the analysis in this section.
- Net additional benefit Is a real resource savings or welfare gain relative to the counterfactual.
- Transfers are payments redistributed within New Zealand. They do not grow the size of total resources available. This is a net benefit only to the extent that the domestic resources used would otherwise have been idle.

At a national level, gross activity overstates net benefits because some of the labour and capital used at Marsden Point would come from other productive uses. The national net gain is instead measured by the resource savings, import substitutability, capability and resilience effects identified in this section, as well as any use of idle domestic resources.

The opportunity cost of labour depends on what workers would otherwise be doing. As described in Section 3, Northland has demonstrable labour-market underutilisation, which means that some Project employment may bring otherwise unemployed or underemployed labour into productive activity rather than displacing existing employment. The extent of that additional benefit will depend on the occupations required, the source of recruitment, workforce development and the degree to which specialist labour is drawn from other productive activity.

5.2 The counterfactual

For the purposes of this assessment, the counterfactual is that the Project does not proceed and no comparable docking facility of sufficient scale currently exists in New Zealand. Under this scenario, the existing patterns will persist: Calliope and Lyttelton can continue to serve the naval fleet and the small end of the commercial fleet until degradation, sea level exposure and encroachment (including reverse sensitivity effects) impact their operations within their physical and operational limits. Larger vessels will continue to rely on facilities in Australia or Asia for relevant out-of-water maintenance. Under this counterfactual, the associated offshore transit, vessel-unavailability and overseas servicing patterns will continue.

Earlier location assessments have identified Marsden Point as the strongest currently identified location for a facility of the required scale. On the available evidence, construction of an equivalent facility elsewhere in New Zealand is not considered within this counterfactual.

5.3 Benefit, cost and transfer streams

Table 2 identifies the principal national economic benefit, cost and transfer streams relevant to the Project and records how each is treated in this report.

Table 2 - Benefit and cost streams

Stream	Category	Basis and status	Treatment
Avoided transit fuel and port costs	Net benefit	Incremental offshore voyage costs avoided where domestic servicing replaces an overseas maintenance trip.	Quantified, indicative
Avoided vessel unavailability	Net benefit	Incremental vessel time lost to offshore transit, net of maintenance downtime that would also occur at the Project facility.	Quantified, indicative
Domestic operating surplus	Net benefit	Incremental operating surplus generated by the facility, after operating costs and net of displaced domestic activity.	Quantified, indicative
Labour-market benefits	Net benefit	Difference between wages paid and the opportunity cost of labour that would otherwise be unemployed, underemployed or employed in another activity. This is dependent on recruitment sourcing and workforce development.	Not quantified
Carbon abatement	Net benefit	Avoided emissions from reduced offshore voyages.	Not quantified
Resilience and option value	Net benefit	Value of having domestic capability against disruption to offshore sites or in an emergency.	Not quantified
Defence maritime capability and strategic resilience	Net benefit	Value of additional domestic servicing base and reduced dependence on Calliope (see Section 5.5, below).	Not quantified

Stream	Category	Basis and status	Treatment
Avoided or deferred expenditure on alternative domestic capability	Net benefit	Capital expenditure on repairing or replacing existing capability that the Project may avoid or defer. The incidence depends on ownership: for Calliope it would fall to the Crown, while replacement of commercial capability would fall to its owner. Timing and amount are unknown.	Not quantified
Retained repair expenditure	Partial benefit	Maintenance expenditure redirected from offshore suppliers to a domestic supplier. It is a net benefit to the extent it employs unused resources.	Not quantified
Displaced domestic work	Transfer	Work drawn from Devonport, Lyttelton or existing marine services providers.	Excluded from net totals
Capital cost	Cost	Derived from earlier high-level options analysis.	Quantified
Operating and maintenance cost	Cost	Does not include capital renewal at set intervals over the 35-year life.	Quantified
Residual environmental and cultural and other Project effects	Cost	Assessed in the relevant specialist reports and not monetised in this economic assessment.	Acknowledged, not valued
Opportunity cost of land and coastal space	Cost	Alternative industrial or port use of the western reclamation area and the coastal marine area occupied relative to the reasonably foreseeable alternative use under the counterfactual.	Not quantified

5.4 Quantifiable national benefits

Three streams can be estimated from the available evidence: avoided transit costs, avoided vessel unavailability and the incremental operating surplus. The estimates below are indicative. They are presented as ranges reflecting a span of plausible input assumptions, not as confidence intervals.

The current estimated capital cost of the project is and the project will also incur periodic renewal costs. These are recorded for completeness, and to demonstrate what a complete appraisal would need to include. These costs are not netted against the estimates below because the set of benefits is only partial.

5.4.1 Avoided transit costs and vessel unavailability

The estimate adopts the 2023 Business Case's illustrative assumption that at least New Zealand-operated large-vessel offshore maintenance voyages would be avoided each year. It is not a forecast of contracted facility demand and is separate from the utilisation assumptions used to estimate facility revenue and operating surplus. The utilisation assumptions derive the facility revenue and operating surplus estimates below.

The avoided-transit benefit is narrower than the full utilisation set. It only includes New Zealand-operated vessels that would not otherwise dry dock at Lyttleton or Calliope.

Table 3 - Transit cost and unavailability calculations

Input	Low	High	Source and basis
Avoided offshore trips per year			2023 Business Case
Transit and positioning days avoided per voyage			WP C14 trip to Singapore = days; 2023 Business Case = days
Fuel cost avoided per voyage			2023 Business Case (updated to 2025 prices)
Overseas port and agency charges	$1,916	$4,925	Cost per day per 100 GT in Singapore[34] x GT of ships[3536] x average dry docking period[37]
Value of avoided vessel time per day	$22,998	$59,118	Handysize vessels daily earning[38] (low). 75% handysize vessel daily earning + 25% opportunity cost of revenue for Bluebridge ferry[3940]
Average cost per round trip			
Average cost per year			
Present value over appraisal period	$79.7m	$123.9m	Discounted at 8%
Present value over appraisal period	$191.6m	$297.9m	

5.4.2 Incremental operating surplus

The Project is forecast to generate an average annual operating surplus of after operating costs, based on the operational revenue and cost profile supplied by MBIE. Over the appraisal period, this produces a present value of at an 8% discount rate and at a 2% discount rate. On the modelling assumptions, this surplus represents an additional national benefit: it is treated as net of operating surplus displaced from existing domestic providers and assumes that facility charges will remain competitive with relevant international alternatives. If final charges exceed those alternatives, only the incremental difference would be treated as a transfer rather than an additional national benefit.

[34] Scale of Dues, Rates and General Fees Notification – Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (30 July 2026)

[35] Low estimate = GT of Interislander Cook Strait Ferries (22,000)

[36] High estimate = GT of Handymax bulk carrier (35,000)

[37] How Downtime Affects Operations – Shipfinex (March 12 2026); low = 14, high = 30. Converted from SD to NZD based on rolling average exchange rate (1.34)

[38] Baltic Dry Index (March 2026) for handysize vessels. Converted USD to NZD based on IRD rolling exchange rate (0.59)

[39] Single boat revenue net of bunker costs (Bluebridge used as this is 40% lower than Interislander. Ferry revenue accounts for two-boat fleet so overstates the marginal loss from operating with just one vessel, because the other can absorb part of the demand. 2018/19 values updated to 2025 prices.

[40] Domestic Transport Costs and Charges Study (WP C15); Cook Strait Ferries – Rockpoint Corporate Finance Ltd and Ian Wallis Associates Ltd (2023)

5.5 Unmonetised benefits

The following national benefit streams are material but not monetised. Their exclusion reflects the absence of a defensible valuation basis at this stage, not a judgement that they are small.

- **Resilience and option value**. New Zealand's access to overseas docking capacity is determined by commercial and sovereign priorities set outside New Zealand. A domestic facility reduces that dependence and creates the option to dock at short notice, including in an emergency. No robust Project-specific monetary estimate is available.
- **Defence capability and strategic resilience**. The Project would add domestic infrastructure and industrial capability to support naval and other strategically important vessels. It would reduce the dependence on Calliope as New Zealand's only naval docking facility and overcome structural limitations at the existing facilities. The two largest capital vessels in the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) – HMNZS *Aotearoa*, the fleet tanker and replenishment ship, and HMNZS *Canterbury*, the strategic sealift vessel – cannot be dry docked anywhere in New Zealand, nor can the fleet tanker that carries the RNZN's strategic fuel reserve[41].
- **Carbon abatement**. Reduced offshore maintenance voyages may avoid fuel consumption and emissions. This effect is not monetised in this report and is addressed qualitatively in the relevant environmental impact material.
- **Labour market benefits** Where the Project employs people who would otherwise be unemployed or underemployed, or builds durable skills, part of the employment effect is a net addition rather than a transfer. The magnitude depends on recruitment sourcing, occupational requirements and workforce development, none of which is established at concept stage.
- **Avoided or deferred equivalent expenditure on Calliope dock**. If the Project does not proceed, expenditure on repairing or replacing existing capability may still be required, and for Calliope that expenditure would fall to the Crown[42].
- **Distributional effects for Northland outcomes**. A substantial share of the Project's employment, value added and household-income effects accrues to a region with materially lower per-capita output and incomes than the national average. No formal distributional weighting is applied in this report, but this concentration is relevant to assessing the significance of the regional benefits.

5.6 Discount rate and appraisal period

Treasury guidance is for commercial proposals use 8% real throughout, with a mandatory 2% sensitivity test. We report the 8% result as central and the 2% result as sensitivity, on the basis that the facility is

[41] Northport Dry Dock Business Case – PwC (2023)

[42] The Ministry of Defence's 2025 Defence Capability Plan puts an indicative cost on upgrades to the future Devonport naval base design at $50m but this is independent of this Project.

expected to generate commercial revenue[43]. In addition, any government investment is effectively replacing private sector investment. Therefore, assessing benefits over time uses the Social Opportunity Cost of Capital (SOC). The 8% SOC rate aligns the public sector with the pre-tax rate of return on secure private investments. The single discount rate is applied to all benefit and cost streams, rather than discounting particular streams at a lower rate because they are strategic or non-commercial.

The reporting period is 35 operating years to 2064, consistent with the assumed consent duration. This is different to the economic life of the facility, which would be expected to extend beyond that date. This appraisal horizon therefore excludes benefits that would accrue after 2064, with the exclusion being more consequential in the sensitivity tests at 2%[44].

5.7 Conclusion on national economic benefits

The available evidence identifies material national economic benefits associated with the Project. These include avoided offshore transit and vessel-unavailability costs, additional domestic servicing activity and operating surplus, together with wider labour-market, resilience and strategic-capability benefits that are not monetised in this report. The quantified estimates are partial and should not be interpreted as a complete net present value or benefit-cost ratio. They nevertheless provide evidence of national benefit streams that would not arise under the counterfactual and are sufficient to form conclusions of the significance of these benefits in Section 6.

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[43] We note that the classification is dependent on the ownership and funding structure, which is unresolved at the time of writing.
[44] Using an 8% discount rate, $1,000 of benefit in 2065 has a present value of just $54, but using 2% it has a value of $471.

6 Statutory assessment

6.1 The FTAA

The Project is a listed project in Schedule 2 of the FTAA. The purpose of the FTAA is to facilitate the delivery of infrastructure and development projects with significant regional or national benefits. This report provides economic evidence relevant to that purpose by assessing the scale, duration, distribution and additionality of the Project's regional and national economic benefits. Market Economics' conclusions on those benefits are set out below.

The FTAA does not prescribe quantitative thresholds for significant regional or national benefits. Significance is inherently contextual and must be assessed with reference to the specific circumstances of the Project. For instance, the expert panel in the Waihi North decision confirmed that significance is an indication of scale, and is not determined solely by whether regional or national GDP will change appreciably.[45]

For the purposes of this economic assessment, regional significance is considered by reference to:

- the scale of the quantified benefits relative to Northland's economic base;
- the structural contribution to the Northland economy, which has an established and widening productivity deficit.

National significance is considered by reference to:

- the domestic maritime-maintenance capability gap addressed by the Project;
- the additional economic activity, avoided offshore costs and import-substitution effects arising under the central counterfactual; and
- the resilience, strategic capability and option value associated with having suitable domestic infrastructure.

Our conclusion is that the Project's economic benefits are significant at both the regional and national levels, for the reasons set out below. The finding of regional significance does not depend on the appraisal inputs in section 5 or because of the scale and distribution of activity measured in Section 4.

[45] Waihi North Project – Final Decision (18 December 2025), [842]–[844], particularly [843].

6.2 Significant regional benefits

In our opinion, the Project will deliver significant regional economic benefits to Northland. That conclusion is supported by the scale and concentration of the modelled effects, their long duration and their structural relevance to the regional economy.

- **Scale of benefits relative to the regional context.** Construction and base case operations will generate an estimated **$1.05 billion of value added in New Zealand** in present value terms at an 8% discount rate. Of that, approximately **$555m will accrue to Northland** – 45% of construction value added and 63% of operational value added. Of the 20,802 job years supported by the Project, 14,069 (68%) are in Northland. Estimated household income accruing to Northland households has a present value of $312m, equivalent to $8m per year over 38 years.

- **Structural economic contribution.** The closure of the Marsden Point refinery removed a key high-productivity employer in the region, causing the loss of around 400 direct jobs. Employment of this scale or character does not reappear without deliberate investment. The Project introduces a high-wage, capital-intensive industrial employer to the same locality, using deep-water and industrial infrastructure that already partially exists.

- **Northland's industrial composition.** The region's productivity shortfall is largely a problem of industry composition and underutilised labour. The Project will add employment in sectors where Northland performs well. This increases the chances that a substantial share of work can be performed by Northland firms and workers.

- **Durability and capability building.** The construction effect is large but short: employment peaks at approximately 1,736 modified employment counts in the first year and averages 1,703 across the three-year build. The operational effect is smaller but sustained, averaging approximately 448 modified employment counts per annum in the base case, of which around 259 are direct positions, and rising toward the end of the modelled period as throughput grows. Realising some of these regional benefits will depend on workforce development and on capability being built in the relevant trades and occupations, but that is itself part of the regional benefit, since skills acquired will be retained beyond any individual contract.

Taken together, these pathways establish regional significance. The Project would direct a large and disproportionate share of employment, value added and household income into a region with structurally weak economic performance, and would sustain that activity for the life of the consent.

6.3 Significant national benefits

In our opinion, the Project will also deliver significant national benefits. These arise from the domestic capability created, avoided reliance on offshore servicing, additional economic activity retained in New Zealand and the resilience and strategic optionality associated with suitable domestic infrastructure.

- **A material domestic capability gap exists.** New Zealand has two permanent dry docks. Both were built in the nineteenth century and neither can accommodate even the first generation of container ships. All four Cook Strait ferries exceed Calliope's dimensional limits, and the two approximately

200-metre replacement rail-enabled ferries entering service in 2029 with a 30-year design life will also exceed the dimensional limits of New Zealand's existing dry docks. The RNZN's two largest ships are also too big for Calliope or Lyttelton.

- **No equivalent domestic alternative is currently identified.** Prior assessments identify Marsden Point as the strongest currently identified location in New Zealand for a facility at this scale. Because the counterfactual is no facility rather than a facility elsewhere, the national benefit is genuinely additional rather than a relocation of activity to another region.

- **Resilience.** International trade accounts for approximately 60% of New Zealand's economic activity and sea lanes carry 99% of that trade by weight. Access to international repair capacity is contingent on commercial and sovereign factors determined outside of New Zealand's control. Shipping routes and logistics can be badly affected by geopolitical events, as has been highlighted in the first half of 2026. Domestic capacity provides resilience against international conditions but is not captured in the quantified impacts.

- **Defence maritime capability and strategic resilience.** The Project would create additional domestic infrastructure and industrial capability potentially relevant to the through-life support of naval and other strategically important vessels. This may reduce concentration at Calliope, increase maintenance and scheduling flexibility, and strengthen the wider domestic defence-industrial and maritime-engineering base. Any conclusions concerning particular Defence vessels or future use of the facility remain subject to validation by the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force.

- **Avoided offshore costs and additional domestic activity.** International shipping requirements mean out-of-water docking is a necessity. In the absence of domestic capacity, New Zealand vessels must travel to Asia or Australia to meet this requirement. Those trips require fuel, port costs and cause a loss of vessel productivity. These avoided costs have an estimated present value of $80m - $124m at an 8% discount rate, with the facility's net operating surplus adding a further

The national benefit is contingent on both quantified and unquantified benefits. In our opinion, given the capability gap, the absence of an alternative site and the resilience and defence benefits together with the quantified streams, the Project will deliver significant national benefits.

6.4 Policy alignment

6.4.1 Going for Growth

Going for Growth is the Government's agenda for lifting economic growth and living standards. It is organised around five pillars: developing talent, competitive business settings, promoting global trade and investment, innovation, technology and science, and infrastructure for growth. The Project engages three of these substantively.

Under **infrastructure for growth**, the Project would add productive infrastructure and address an identified national capability gap. The absence of suitable domestic large-vessel maintenance capacity imposes recurring cost, availability and scheduling constraints on New Zealand operators and results in the associated maintenance activity being undertaken offshore.

Under **developing talent**, the Project would create and sustain specialist workforce and supplier capability in marine engineering and heavy maintenance trades. That capability is presently thin, in part because the work is performed overseas. Building it in a region with materially lower labour utilisation than the national average also contributes to the distributional dimension of the growth agenda.

Under **promoting global trade and investment**, the Project would reduce the reliance of New Zealand's trading and connectivity fleet on offshore maintenance, retaining expenditure domestically and reducing the exposure of vessels serving New Zealand's trade to foreign capacity decisions.

6.4.2 Freight and Supply Chain Strategy

The Aotearoa New Zealand Freight and Supply Chain Strategy identifies the exposure arising from New Zealand's small cargo volumes, its distance from the main East-West shipping routes and dependence on international operators[46]. It also identifies the resilience of the freight system to disruption and to extreme weather as a strategic priority. The Project will respond to these issues. It reduces dependence on offshore facilities whose availability is contingent on the priority accorded to a small and distant market. The Project also provides capability for coastal shipping by enabling more heavy maintenance to occur domestically. Coastal shipping can provide an alternative freight pathway where road or rail networks are disrupted, although the resilience of the wider coastal shipping system depends on a range of infrastructure, commercial and policy settings beyond the Project itself.

6.5 Analytical limitations and caveats

Key caveats and limitations are recorded throughout this report. The list below summarises some of the key ones.

- The project configuration is at the concept design stage. Specifications, lifting capacity, footprint and capital cost remain provisional, and the configuration modelled differs from that for which the demand evidence was originally developed.
- The input assumptions have been supplied by MBIE from a high-level options analysis. We have not verified these independently. No primary demand analysis has been undertaken.
- The cost inputs do not include capital renewal expenditure. Offsets, compensation costs and the opportunity costs of the reclamation area are also excluded. This means costs are understated as well as benefits.
- The operating surplus requires facility prices to be at or below offshore alternatives. If they are above, the difference would be a transfer.
- Work displaced from Devonport, Lyttelton and other existing marine services providers is a transfer within New Zealand.

[46] Aotearoa New Zealand Freight and Supply Chain Strategy – Te Manatū Waka Ministry of Transport (2023).

- Input-Output analysis has well-documented limitations. It measures gross activity, not net economic benefit. The latest supply-use tables are for the 2019-20 year, so this includes Marsden Point refinery employment. The direction and consequences of this effect on the Project results are uncertain.

Subject to these matters and the stated assumptions, we consider the evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the Project will deliver significant regional and national economic benefits.

7 Conclusion

New Zealand lacks a domestic shipyard and dry dock facility capable of providing out-of-water servicing and heavy marine maintenance on the for many of the larger vessels supporting the country's freight, passenger, energy and strategic maritime functions. Both existing dry docks within New Zealand were built in the nineteenth century and cannot accommodate many vessels now operating in New Zealand waters, including the existing Cook Strait ferries. In the absence of suitable domestic capacity, larger vessels must continue to rely on facilities in Australia or Asia, incurring additional transit costs, vessel unavailability and exposure to offshore capacity and scheduling decisions.

The regional benefits of undertaking the project at Marsden Point are significant. Construction and base case operations are estimated to generate $1.05bn of value added in present value terms at an 8% discount rate, of which approximately $555m accrues to Northland. Of the 20,802 job years supported nationally, 14,069 (68%) are in Northland, and household income accruing to Northland households has a present value of $312m. These benefits occur in a region with a large GDP per capita shortfall relative to the rest of the country, in industries where Northland already performs well, and in a locality that lost around 400 direct jobs when the Marsden Point oil refinery closed in 2022.

The Project's national benefits are also significant. The facility would address a material domestic maritime-maintenance capability gap and reduce reliance on overseas servicing for relevant vessels. The quantified benefit streams include avoided offshore transit, port and vessel-unavailability costs with an estimated present value of $80 million to $124 million at an 8% discount rate, together with estimated incremental operating surplus of [redacted] subject to the assumptions set out in section 5. These quantified effects sit alongside material resilience, strategic maritime capability, defence-industrial, labour-capability and option-value benefits that are not monetised in this report. The absence of a complete benefit-cost ratio does not mean those benefits are absent or insignificant.

In summary, the economic effects associated with the Northland Shipyard and Dry Dock Project will deliver significant regional and national benefits. Regionally, those benefits arise from the scale, duration and concentration of value added, employment, household income and industrial capability in Northland. Nationally, they arise from additional domestic maritime-maintenance capability, avoided offshore costs, retained economic activity and increased resilience and strategic optionality. This report does not assess the Project's environmental, cultural or other effects or recommend whether the approvals should be granted. Those matters are addressed through the wider application and determined by the Panel under the applicable statutory framework

8 Authors' CVs

Tom Harris – Lead Author

Senior Consultant

MSc Economics (Distinction);
BSc Economics (First Class with Honours)

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Professional Experience

2023 to date	*Senior Consultant – Market Economics*
2021 – 2023	Economist – Department of Education (UK)
2019 – 2021	Fast Stream Assistant Economist – Department of Education (UK)
2018 – 2019	Economic Scholar – University of Exeter

Tom joined Market Economics from the UK Civil Service in 2023 where he worked as an economist across a challenging portfolio of projects and sectors. During the Covid-19 pandemic he was the principal analyst in the Department for Education modelling the pandemic's impacts on Children's Social Care. His other roles included leading on graduate outcomes analysis, supporting high-profile national policy implementation, being embedded in the permanent secretary's office, and working closely with external academics and stakeholders.

Tom taught undergraduate macroeconomics at The University of Exeter, then completed his Master's part-time alongside his work in the UK Civil Service. Using his access to novel administrative governmental datasets, he authored research into topics which included comparing the scarring effect on early-career earnings of graduating during the Covid-19 years with the Global Financial Crisis, and assessing whether prospective university students could be nudged into making better application choices. Tom has extensive experience working with senior officials and politicians to guide policy- and decision-making with analysis. As a proficient and interested coder, Tom has written a book on the R programming language and published open-source software packages to aid data analysis.

Tom has founded and runs Good with Data, a charity that connects analytical professionals to third sector organisations, enabling charities to benefit from pro bono expertise and for analysts to contribute their time towards meaningful causes productively.

Areas of Expertise

Econometrics| Game Theory | Empirical Industrial Organisation | Mathematical and Algorithmic Modelling | Machine (Statistical) Learning Models | Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods | Public Economics | Economic Appraisal | Sectoral Analysis | Cost Benefit Analysis | Demand Analysis and Forecasting | Policy Analysis and Advice | Business Cases | Project Management

Tom has successfully completed a range of economic assessments with the following recent projects showing the breadth of relevant experience.

- Fergursson and Bledisloe Wharfs Extensions. Fast-Track Economic Impact Assessment for the Ports of Auckland.
- Brookby Quarry Stage 3. Economic assessment to support Fast-Track Application.
- Brick Bay Lodge. Fast Track Economic Assessment.
- Southern Screenworks fill site application. Fast-Track Economic Impact Analysis.
- Auckland Prison. Fast-Track Economic Impact Assessment for the Department of Corrections.
- Dirtworks consent application. Fast-Track Economic Analysis.
- Lochaburn Quarry. Fast-Track Eligibility Assessment.
- National Aggregate Sufficiency. Research for Aggregate Quarry Association into inter-regional dependence for aggregate and national supply sufficiency.
- Heart of the City – Auckland Retail Market Assessment (2025, 2026)
- Haldon Solar Farm. Economic Impact Assessment.
- Waerenga and Rangiriri Solar Farms. Peer reviews of economic assessments.
- The Point Solar Farm – Fast Track Economic Assessment.
- Opunake and Carterton Solar Farms – Economic Impact Assessments.
- Dunedin Heritage Protections. Economic Impact Assessment for Dunedin City Council focussing on development feasibility and regression analysis of property price impacts.
- Hamilton WISE model to developer contributions modelling.
- Waihi Gold Mine extension. Economic Assessment and Peer Review of Applicant's assessments for Hauraki District Council.
- Forecasting the price path of Greenshell Mussels. VAR and ARIMA forecasting methods for NZTE.
- Taylorville Resource Park. Resource Consent Economic Impact Assessment.
- Timaru Showgrounds retail park configuration and liquor store, economic effects analysis.
- Auckland Developer Contributions, assessment of economic equity impacts.
- Queenstown Lakes District impact of Airbnb and short-term rental accommodation on property prices and rents.
- Queenstown Lakes District economic impact of Queenstown Cable Car proposal.
- Auckland Council policy analysis for Plan Change 78; Plan Change 79.
- Nelson Housing and Business Development Capacity Assessment (HBA) Analysis.

Gregory Akehurst – Review and Quality Assurance

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Professional Experience

- 2001 – 2025: Director, Market Economics Ltd
- 1996 – 2001: Senior Analyst, McDermot Fairgray Ltd.

Greg is a founding Director of Market Economics and has 30 years' experience consulting to a wide range of sectors in both the New Zealand and Australian markets. His experience covers assessment of market structure, size and change for development clients, economic impact assessment for commercial and government clients, as well as strategic policy, social infrastructure and amenity studies carried out for local councils. He has developed models to assess community needs and assess allocation networks set up to meet those needs. Greg leads 20-30 projects annually and has given expert witness evidence in local government hearings, before the EPA, the Environment Court and provided affidavits as an expert for the High Court.

Greg headed the team investigating the Canterbury Earthquake Rebuilds, labour force, materials and temporary housing requirements for government. In recent years he has led studies into infrastructure projects, Air Quality Impact modelling, as well as sector studies (Marine Industry, Quarrying and the aggregate sector and Construction). These studies draw together all aspects of inputs, to present central and local government with comprehensive assessments on economies' growth and change. Greg has also specialised in assessing Council funding mechanisms – in particular Development Contributions and Financial Contributions for both Councils and the development sector.

Greg authored the Guidebook for Growth Councils that needed to carry out non-residential land capacity and demand assessments to meet their obligations under the National Policy Statement on Urban Development Capacity (NPS-UDC). He was Auckland Council's chief economic witness with respect to Business Land in the Unitary Plan Hearings and led a number of projects around the country investigating business land requirements under the NPS for high growth Councils (Auckland, Future Proof, Queenstown). Greg has also carried out numerous economic studies in support of Fast Track applications under the COVID-19 FT Bill and the Fast Track Approvals Act 2024. Greg is currently the independent expert on the Development Agreements Committee for Waikato District Council.

Relevant Areas of Expertise

Spatial and Economic Analysis and Modelling | Input-Output Modelling | Urban and Regional Economics | Skills and Labour Force Modelling | Economic Growth Modelling | Supply and Demand Analysis | Sectoral and Specialist Market Analysis | Demand Analysis and Forecasting | Economic Impact Assessment | Policy

Analysis and Advice | Infrastructure Funding and Investment | Local Government Funding | Resource Management | Strategic Advice | Peer Review

Greg has successfully completed a range of economic assessments with the following recent projects showing the breadth of relevant experience.

- Pakiri consent renewals – economic effects assessment (consent assessment, council hearings)
- Brookby Quarry Stage 1. Economic assessment to support Expansion, Environment Court
- Drury Quarry. Economic assessment and Council hearing
- Hunua Quarry Consent application. Economic assessment and Council hearing
- Waingaro Quarry Consent application. Economic assessment
- Kings Quarry FT application – Economic Assessment
- Drury Metropolitan Centre – Economic Impact Assessment and Council Hearing
- Drury Metropolitan Centre – Development Contributions Assessment
- Ryman Healthcare Pukekohe – Development Contributions Assessment, Council Hearing
- Retirement Village Association – DC Assessment nationwide for 20+ Councils
- Wetland Provisions of NES for Freshwater – Economic Assessment of Aggregate loss for regions
- West Coast Coal – Peer review of Economic Assessment
- Waihi North Gold Mine – Peer Review of Economic Impact Assessment for Fast Track
- Martha Mine expansion – Economic peer review assessment
- Industrial Land Demand – Matamata Industrial land demand, private sector client
- NPS-UDC – Guidebook author for Business Land Assessment approach
- NPS – UDC – HBDA for Future Proof, Tauranga, Queenstown Lakes, Dunedin City
- NPS-UD HBDA assessment for Future Proof, oversee others.
- Marine Industry Assessment – Cracker Bay development, Wynyard Quarter
- Selwyn District – PC 73, assessment and critique of HBA prepared for SDC in support of development
- Lincoln Residential Development – Residential Demand modelling, Council evidence
- Ohoka PC 31 – Demand modelling, HBA critique, Council evidence for developer
- Auckland Prison EIA – Fast track economic assessment for Auckland Prison, Department of Corrections
- Dunedin Heritage Protections – Assess economic impacts of adding 146 properties to heritage protection list
- Waimanawa Estate Warkworth – Retail Demand assessment and economic impact assessment incl. council evidence
- Waerenga and Rangiriri Solar FT – Peer review of economic impacts for EPA
- Hamilton City Development Contributions Growth Model
- Peacocke Structure Plan – Economic Review and evidence for HCC
- Development Contributions High Court Affidavit – in support of Hamilton City DC Policy CIV-2020-419-202
- Ravenswood Economic Impact Peer Review – Infinity Holdings, overturned Hearing Panel Verdict.
- Other Fast Track Assessments:
  - Drury Metropolitan Centre
  - Haldon Solar
  - Karori Metlife Care Village
  - Mill Road Stage 1
  - Opunake Solar Farm
  - Summerset Rotorua Village
  - Summerset Half Moon Bay
  - Waihi North Mine

- Tauranga Crossing PC 33 – Demand assessment and centre assessment, Council Evidence
- NZTA Silverdale PPC 103 – Financial Contributions potential, Council evidence
- NZTA Cambridge to Piarere Economic Impact Assessment – Council evidence
- Development Contributions – High Court Affidavit, Developers vs North Shore City Council.